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The draft legislation on the control of pornography in Indonesia that became known as the RUU 
APP1 generated more controversy and public mobilisation than any other legislation deliberated in 
the DPR in the post-New Order era. The bill was not contentious because of its intention to restrict 
pornography but mainly because one of the drafts introduced the concept of pornoaksi, “porno-
                                               
1 Rencana Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi (Bill on Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts) 
Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The question is as old as the nation: What role is Islam supposed to play in society and, more 
importantly, in governing Muslim Indonesia. While having a paramount Muslim majority, the 
country is, after all, a multi-cultural and multi-religious country. Its Muslim majority 
traditionally embraces values of tolerance and understanding towards those who practice 
another faith.  
The authors of Indonesia’s constitution saw this as a constitutive principle of the Indonesian 
society as well as a prerequisite for the unity of the nation. They intended to protect the 
legitimate interests of all faiths through article 29 of the constitution which stipulates that “the 
state guarantees the freedom of all residents to embrace their own religion and to worship 
according to the own religion and beliefs”.  
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actions” or “pornographic acts”. This meant that as well as banning the production, sale and 
viewing of pornographic material, the bill would ban a vast range of other activities in public places 
which it deemed would “exploit sexuality”.2 These included “showing sensual parts of the body”, 
“erotic dancing or swaying”, being “naked in public”, “kissing on the lips in public” and a whole 
range of other body movements and displays considered to be of a sexual nature.3  
 
The bill set off a bitter public debate. Its supporters, particularly Islamic modernist groups such as 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and Muhammadiyah and individuals from a range of parties in the 
DPR, considered that the bill was vital to combat the spread of pornography and acts which were 
undermining the country’s morals, particularly under Western influence. Its opponents represented 
a spectrum of movements, ranging from secularist parties and groups, women’s groups, cultural and 
artistic associations and representatives of ethnic and religious minorities, all of whom attacked the 
bill as an effort by a minority current in Indonesian society to impose its interpretation of 
religiously sanctioned behaviour on the rest of the country (Djakse 2006), particularly on women 
(Sari 2006). The issue divided the Islamic community, with the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) opposed 
to the bill and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figures taking contrary positions. Both sides in the controversy 
organised mass rallies throughout the country and it even ignited rhetoric from places such as Bali, 
with its Hindu population, about succession from Indonesia.4 
 
The controversy touched on matters which went to the heart of the implicit compact between the 
various religious, ethnic, regional and cultural streams in Indonesia. The RUU APP was a clear 
example of the potential of the DPR to raise issues and introduce new elements of debate into 
Indonesian politics that had largely been suppressed under the New Order. In this case the DPR 
became a forum for a particular stream (aliran) of Islamic opinion that did not necessarily accept 
the interpretation of Pancasila as an official inclusive ideology that came to predominate under the 
New Order. Basic issues about the secular basis of the Indonesian state5, largely considered to have 
been resolved since the 1960s, re-emerged through the medium of parliament. In 2000 there had 
been an attempt in the MPR to reintroduce the “Jakarta Charter” into the 1945 Constitution, which 
would have obliged Muslims to observe the tenets of the faith into which they were born and 
which, arguably, would have opened up the floodgates of a stream of sharia-based legislation 
(Wahid 2007). With the failure of this attempt, many Indonesian secularists saw the anti-
pornography bill as a second attempt to introduce similar measures under a different guise (Allen 
2007). 
 
Similar matters came to the surface at the regional level at around the same time. Debate on the 
anti-pornography bill merged into the intense controversy stirred up by sharia-influenced 
regulations on public behaviour that were introduced by some local governments following the 
devolution of powers to the regions. Various governors, district heads and mayors had introduced 
regulations on gambling, alcohol, prostitution, the wearing of Islamic clothing, reading of the Koran 
                                               
2  RUU Tentang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, Article 1 (2) (Draft of 2004). 
3  Articles 25-33. 
4  “Tensi Tinggi Di Antara Pasal Lonjong”, Tempo, 26 March 2006, pp.87-90. 
5  It should be noted that the use of the term “secularism” is often avoided even by those who accept the notion of a 
clear separation between religion and the state. This is partly because the version of secularism most influential in 
post-independence Indonesia has been based on the idea that the state should promote religious observance, but 
without the promotion of one particular brand of religion. This is in contrast to the more strongly non-religious 
conception of the state that was, for example, articulated in post-independence India. In India, the dominant (though 
far from uncontested) interpretation of secularism suggested that the state should not promote any religion while in 
Indonesia the suggestion was that the state should promote all religions, but do so equally. 
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and the conduct of women in public (Salim 2007, Bush 2008). One women’s group opposed to the 
bill claimed that the regulations were a “copy-paste” from the RUU APP (Widyawati 2006:19). 
While the connection between the regulations and the anti-pornography bill may not have been as 
direct as this activist’s polemical assertion would suggest, the first official version of the bill 
appeared in 2003, the year that, according to Bush (2008:5), the enactment of religious-influenced 
regulations reached their peak. 
 
This paper is an examination of the RUU APP as a case study of how decisions are made in the DPR 
in circumstances where deep differences of opinion are at stake and where public interest in the 
outcome of the decision is intense. It uses the example of the RUU APP to indicate that there are a 
number of unique features about decision-making in the DPR that led the parliament into 
producing a bill that stirred up such deep emotions. The paper concludes that there are a number of 
serious flaws in the way business is conducted in the various bodies of the DPR and in the 
interaction between the members of these bodies and the party organisations from which they 
come.  
 
The origins of RUU APP 
 
The RUU APP has gone through a complex series of changes and amendments, with various versions 
of the bill, both official and unofficial, having been under debate for six years. The origins of the bill 
are difficult to determine precisely, a fact that has been noted by other writers researching the 
background to the bill (Allen 2007, Braun 2008, McGibbon 2006). Few of the leading actors in the 
controversy appear to have a clear idea of its genesis and, in fact, give contradictory accounts of 
how the proposal originated.  
 
The debate on morality and pornography 
 
The context of the bill was a perception that the increased freedom of the post-Soeharto era had 
led to an explosion of pornography and overt sexuality in the media, entertainment and advertising. 
The lifting of the draconian restrictions on the media under the New Order had allowed the 
proliferation of new tabloid publications, while new media such as VCDs/DVDs and the internet had 
made explicitly sexual material available in an unprecedented way. A number of controversies 
played a role in generating fears in some sections of the community that public morality was on the 
decline. First there was the phenomenon of the wildly popular dangdut performer, Inul Daratista, 
with her erotically-charged dancing style, who had both adulation and condemnation heaped on 
her. Then came the publication of the Indonesian version of the US magazine Playboy in January 
2006. This was a local edition whose content was much less sexually explicit than many home-
grown magazines, but it was attacked as being a spearhead of foreign moral degeneracy, a “global 
trademark of pornography” as it was dubbed by Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of NU. 
 
There were in fact a number of uncoordinated initiatives to produce a legislative response to the 
situation, even before a bill was sponsored within the DPR. During the Habibie administration, the 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment had made moves to draft a regulation on pornography. Similar 
moves were initiated by the Ministry of Religion under the Wahid administration, particularly as a 
result of pressure from MUI. There were a number of proposed drafts composed from 1998 onwards, 
with possibly the earliest coming from the former Minister for Women’s Empowerment, Mur 
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Pratomo.6 A bill was drafted independently by staff of the Faculty of Law at the University of 
Indonesia. It was this bill that appears to have found its way to DPR Commission VII (the committee 
responsible for religion and women’s affairs) through informal connections and which formed a 
basis for the initial text of the bill.7 The text was also influenced by a draft produced within the 
Ministry of Religion. This was not an official government document, but was sent directly to 
Commission VII, rather than through the Speaker of the DPR as would have been the case if it 
represented a formal stance by the government.8 
 
From pornography to “pornoaksi” 
 
In August 2003, twenty-four DPR Members “from various Fraksi”9 (party caucuses) in Commission 
VII submitted a proposal for a bill on anti-pornography to the Legislation Council of the DPR 
(Baleg), which in turn agreed to take responsibility for its further drafting and to sponsor it as a DPR 
Initiative bill. The draft bill was then submitted to the Consultative Council (Bamus) of the DPR 
which is made up of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers and the leaders of the Fraksi and 
Commissions. All parties, through their Fraksi leaders, agreed to schedule a discussion on the draft 
at a subsequent plenary session. At the plenary in September 2003 all Fraksi again agreed to accept 
the bill and to form a Special Committee (Pansus) of 50 members to conduct deliberations on the 
bill and finalise the draft. This draft made no mention of the concept of pornoaksi and concentrated 
on creating sanctions against the production, reproduction, sale and viewing of pornography. At this 
stage, a fact-finding tour through various parts of Indonesia by DPR Members and staff to gauge 
community views elicited little reaction from the public. The bill in its first form appears to have 
been regarded as uncontroversial.10  
 
During subsequent discussions within Baleg and the Pansus, however, the suggestion arose that the 
bill was “not sufficiently comprehensive”, in the words of the Chair of Baleg and PPP member, Zain 
Badjeber.11 The initial idea was to create another bill to ban what was seen as the wider problem of 
pornoaksi, a concept which had first been introduced to the world in a fatwa issued the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI) in 2001.12 The idea came about as a result of lobbying from a range of Islamic 
organisations, especially MUI, and from leading figures from the Islamic community who had 
connections with some of the members of Baleg active around the bill, particularly those from PPP. 
It was later decided to incorporate the pornoaksi concept into a single and greatly expanded bill 
which was made public, at least to the extent that it was forwarded to the DPR Leadership (Chair 
and Vice-Chairs) in February 2004.  
 
The new bill, however, was not widely distributed outside the DPR and received little public 
attention. It languished for want of sufficiently strong backing from powerful figures in the DPR. As 
the elections of 2004 approached the attention of most DPR Members was directed towards 
lobbying within their parties in order to gain a place on the electoral ticket. One of the most 
important reasons for the failure of the bill to proceed much further before the 2004 elections was, 
                                               
6  Interview with leading member of DPR Special Committee (Pansus) RUU APP, February 2008. 
7  Interview with an adviser to the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, February 2008. 
8  Interview with DPR staff member, February 2008. See also McGibbon (2006), p.335. 
9  Hukumonline archive, 31 December 2003. (www.hukumonline.or.id) 
10  Interview with DPR staff member, January 2008. 
11  “RUU Anti……” Hukumonline, 8 March 2004. 
12  Fatwa MUI tentang Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, as published by Hukulonline, 25 November 2003. The word “pornaksi” 
did not exist in the Indonesian language before this period. 
 5 
as an initiative of the DPR, it still required the agreement of executive government to proceed to 
serious discussion.  
 
Because then President Megawati’s administration did not name a counterpart Minister to discuss 
the bill with the DPR and failed to send the appropriate documentation in the form of an 
Presidential Mandate (Ampres) during 2003 and 2004, the bill could not become a priority for 
discussion. In the absence of any key champion within the DPR who could put pressure on the 
government to respond to the parliament’s request for the naming of a government representative 
to join the deliberations on the bill, it was added to the growing backlog of legislation in the DPR. 
While the backlog was becoming the target of repeated criticism and indeed derision from elements 
of the media, the DPR appeared unable to make serious progress in clearing the accumulated bills 
and the RUU APP did not loom in anyone’s attention as being of any particular importance.  
 
The RUU APP is revived  
 
In April 2004 legislative elections were held and in October a new DPR was sworn in. In January 
2005, a joint meeting of DPR and Government representatives drew up the National Legislation 
Program (Prolegnas) for the new parliament. Of 55 bills in Prolegnas, 22 were left over from the old 
DPR, including the RUU APP.13 Once again, however, there was little sign that the RUU APP had 
powerful promoters in the DPR. During the first part of 2005 the bill made little or no headway 
through the processes of the parliament. 
 
Then in September 2005, the matter once again came onto the agenda of a plenary session. 
Members of Commission VIII (the committee for religious and women’s affairs in the new DPR) sent 
the draft to Baleg who agreed to submit the bill to Bamus for inclusion in a plenary discussion. The 
proposal received the consent of all party leaders in Bamus which then scheduled it for a plenary, at 
which all Fraksi agreed to form a Special Committee (Pansus) to deliberate on the bill. A Pansus of 
50 Members was created under the Chairmanship of Balkan Kaplale, a representative from the 
Democrat Party, the party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, with Vice Chairs from PDIP, 
Golkar, PPP and PKS. 
 
When the draft bill was behind the walls of the DPR Secretariat building in Senayan, accessible only 
to those with personal contacts amongst the staff, it did not create any kind of stir. But in October 
2005 the Pansus began to hold public hearings (rapat dengar pendapat umum) about the bill. And it 
was from this time onwards that the RUU APP really became an explosive public issue. As a wider 
cross section of opinion had the opportunity to read the bill and began to realise its implications, 
there was an outpouring of divisive debate and public mobilisation that appears to have surprised 
many members of the Pansus.14 There was a wave of public demonstrations by both opponents and 
supporters that reached its peak in the middle of 2006. Despite a community response that seemed 
to indicate that the bill needed serious reconsideration, the Chair of the Pansus declared that the 
bill would be passed by June 2006. The urgings of the MUI that the DPR should keep to such a 
schedule suggested to some that the Chair was working closely with one stream of opinion while 
purporting to speak for the Pansus as a whole. Other members of the Pansus, especially from PDIP, 
came out in bitter public criticism of the Chair. From this point onwards PDIP boycotted any further 
meetings of the Pansus. 
                                               
13  “Puluhan RUU Masuk Prioritas Prolegnas 2005”, Hukumonline, 31 January 2005. 
14  Interviews with Pansus members, November 2007 & February 2008. 
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The work of the Pansus slowed to a halt by mid-2006 because so many members were not 
attending meetings. Public debate died down somewhat and the issue ceased to dominate the 
political scene. In subsequent months the Pansus members who supported the bill retreated from 
their original position and begun to negotiate the removal of the controversial clauses of the bill 
related to pornoaksi. It was perhaps significant that President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, who had 
previously avoided taking any particular public position on the bill, used his Pancasila Day address 
to appeal for a reaffirmation of respect for diversity as “the fundamental basis of our national 
life”.15 Redrafting of the bill began in August and a new version was completed by September. 
During September and October, media reports were appearing with stories that there were two or 
more competing drafts of the bill, with the provisions related to pornoaksi either removed or heavily 
amended. This period was characterised by a great deal of confusion, when journalists and those 
lobbying around the bill found it very difficult to obtain consistent and reliable information.  
 
But by the end of the year it was clear that the pornoaksi sections of the bill had largely been 
removed, although the term was still used without explanation in a number of places in the text. 
Many critics of the bill maintained their opposition on the grounds that the text used an unclear 
and unenforceable definition of pornography and failed to deal with issues such as the protection of 
children. But with the focus shifted to control of pornography and away from measures that 
appeared designed to enforce a particular view of acceptable moral behaviour, the stridency of the 
previous year disappeared from public debate.  
 
It was clear from media reports (and confirmed in interviews conducted by the author) that both 
the proponents and opponents of the bill in the Pansus were taken aback by the level and intensity 
of public reaction and by the potential for serious political and social division that had been 
revealed. There can be little doubt that it was the pressure of public opinion that saw the text of 
the bill fundamentally changed. The removal of the chapters related to pornoaksi made it possible 
for the parties in the Pansus who opposed the original draft to accept the possibility that the bill 
might be passed and to rejoin official deliberations. By January 2007 the Pansus had revealed the 
new amended version of the bill to the public.  
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the calming down of political tensions over the bill, the government 
did not finally announce its decision to officially join the deliberations on the bill until September 
2007. When the President formally indicated the government’s agreement to begin discussions on 
the bill, with the sending of a Presidential Letter (Surat Presiden) to the DPR in September 2007, 
there was a greatly increased possibility that the RUU APP might be passed. He named four 
Ministers to be counterparts in the discussions with the DPR: the Ministers for Religion, Law & 
Human Rights, Empowerment of Women and Communications & Information, with the Minister for 
Religion to take the lead role.  
 
At the time of writing, the four ministries are preparing their respective List of Issues (Daftar 
Inventaris Masalah – DIMs). DIMs are a list of matters that either the government or parliamentary 
side in the deliberations on a bill wish to have raised in the Pansus. A government inter-
departmental committee has been established to coordinate the production of the DIMs by the four 
Ministries. When the government’s DIMs are drafted they will form the basis for the discussion 
between the government and the Pansus in the DPR. When agreement is reached over each of the 
                                               
15  Tempo, 5-11 June 2006. Cited by Rod McGibbon, “Indonesian Politics in 2006: Stability, Compromise and Shifting 
Contests over Ideology”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 42, 3, 2006, p.336. 
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issues in the DIMs the bill will be able to be passed onto a plenary session of the DPR for final 
approval, a step which is almost always a matter of ceremony only. Unless significant priority is 
given to the bill, it seems unlikely that it will be passed before the elections of 2009. 
 
 
The Pornography Bill and the DPR 
 
It is important to understand that the RUU APP was an initiative from within the DPR, rather than 
coming from an executive government agency such as a Ministry or the President him/herself. 
Under the New Order, all legislation was initiated by executive government and rubber-stamped by 
the DPR. No bills at all were drafted by the parliament during the Soeharto regime. During the 
interim regime of President Habibie, the still-unelected DPR struggled to draft just three bills, as 
part of its efforts to assert its legitimacy in the post-Soeharto period. Even after the free elections 
of 1999 and the swearing in of the democratically elected assembly of 1999-2004 and 
constitutional amendments to increase the legislative authority of the parliament, the DPR was able 
to initiate only a small number of bills and few of these were actually passed. Almost all of the bills 
passed by the 1999-2004 DPR were government bills.  
 
The RUU APP was therefore initiated in the context of a parliament that was still operating under 
the shadow of the dominance of executive government inherited from the New Order.16 The 
majority of DPR Members elected in 1999 entered parliament for the first time and very few of 
them were re-elected in 2004. The chamber was full of inexperienced Members and the DPR as 
institution, especially the Secretariat, was still largely unreformed as it entered into an era of 
democratic politics and a potentially greatly increased role for the parliament in the formation of 
policy. There is some debate about whether the absolute amount of financial resources provided for 
the running of the DPR is sufficient (NDI 2006), but there can little doubt that the funds are poorly 
managed and that human resources to support the functions of the DPR remain seriously 
undeveloped (Sherlock 2003, 2006). 
 
The politics of Islam and secularism in the DPR 
 
The commonly expressed view in the media and amongst most activists opposing the bill was that it 
had been initiated by Islamic parties, especially PKS, but also PPP and PBB. This seemed to fit with 
the reputation of PKS as both well-organised and aggressive in its campaign to spread a strict or 
even extremist version of santri or modernist Islam across Indonesian society and politics. The 
organisational acumen of the PKS has become legendary amongst rival parties. And the initial drafts 
of the bill do appear to have been heavily influenced by MUI through its connections with PPP in 
the 1999-2004 DPR. Therefore the easy conclusion was that the bill was a push by Islamist forces 
inside and outside the DPR, led by PKS. This idea became accepted as a fact with its repetition and 
recycling in the media.  
 
The reality, however, appears to be more complex and interesting. An examination of such 
documentary evidence as can be obtained from the DPR and interviews with participants and close 
                                               
16  For a fuller analysis of the 1999-2004 DPR see Sherlock (2003). For a study of later developments, particularly the 
relations between the DPR and executive government following the direct election of the President in 2004 see 
Sherlock (2007). 
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observers of events indicate that, while PKS members of the Pansus generally supported the bill 
(including the sections on pornoaksi) PKS as a party was not particularly responsible for the key 
decision to revive the bill in mid-2005. In June 2005, twenty-nine Members of Commission VIII 
signed the documentation necessary to have the bill passed to a plenary session to formalise its 
status as a DPR Initiative Bill and to create the Pansus. The twenty-nine Members (roughly half of 
the Commission) included representatives from all major Fraksi, with the largest number coming 
from Golkar (8 signatories) and PDIP (5 signatories) (Braun 2008: 161).  
 
The most consistently enthusiastic supporters of the bill in the Pansus seem to have come from 
Golkar and the Democrat Party. As mentioned above, the Chair of the Pansus was from the 
Democrat Party. Organisations lobbying the Pansus repeatedly observed that while Golkar and 
Democrat members often did not welcome approaches from outside groups or were even hostile to 
them, PKS members generally showed themselves to be receptive to ideas and arguments about the 
contents of the bill.17 One women’s organisation complained that the Democrat Chair of the Pansus 
was publicly antagonistic to female opponents of the bill during DPR consultation sessions, while 
warmly welcoming male representatives of Islamic organisations clad in Islamic dress (Widyawati 
2006: 23-25).  
 
Although PDIP became identified as the most vocal opponent of the bill during the heated 
atmosphere of debate in 2006, the party’s Members in Commission VIII and in the Pansus did not 
prevent the bill from becoming an official initiative of the DPR. A PDIP spokesperson, Tukidjo, 
expressed opposition to the bill at the time of the formation of the Pansus in September 2005, not 
because of the pornoaksi provisions that were soon to become so contentious, but because the 
problem of pornography was already dealt with in a range of other laws and in the Criminal Code. 
He also argued that the bill did not deal with the problem from the perspective of the victimisation 
of women and that its definitions of pornography and pornoaksi were problematic.18 But as a Fraksi, 
PDIP supported the bill at all the procedural stages of its passage through the DPR. 
 
Non-Islamic parties such as Golkar were at least as much behind the push for RUU APP as were 
Islamic parties. Serious opposition from PDIP did not emerge until the bill became the centre of 
public controversy in 2006. The promotion of issues usually associated with Islamist forces by 
parties with a more secular image should not be surprising. In fact it is a repetition of the 
circumstances behind the creation of sharia-influenced regulations in provinces and districts 
throughout the country. In many cases, the regulations were passed by governments and regional 
assemblies controlled by Golkar or PDIP, whether in coalition with Islamic or non-Islamic parties 
(Bush 2008:7). The well-known (or notorious) regulation against prostitution and alcohol in the city 
of Tangerang abutting on the Special Region of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta) was sponsored by a Golkar 
mayor.  
 
The actions of Golkar and Democrat members of the DPR over RUU APP can be seen as an example 
of a wider phenomenon that emerged throughout Indonesia from around the beginning of the 
decade. There was a perceived rise in the strength of political Islam in the context of a spread of 
electoral politics to the regions, first with the election of provincial and district assemblies (DPR-D) 
and then with the election of Governors and District Heads (Bupati). Weak regional assemblies and 
governments with little policy-making capacity, struggling to establish authority and legitimacy, 
                                               
17  Interviews with media and women’s organisations, November 2007 and February 2008. 
18  “Fraksi PDIP Belum Menyetujui RUU Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi”, Hukumonline, 13 September 2005. “DPR Bentuk 
Pansus RUU Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi”, Hukumonline, 28 September 2005. 
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were tempted to seek easy popularity by promoting themselves as defenders of morality and 
religion. Such regulations were also much easier to pass than complex legislation relating to health, 
education and economic management and they might remedy growing public perceptions about 
incapacity to produce legislation.  
 
Secular forces within regional institutions, under pressure (whether real or imagined) from assertive 
Islamists, saw this as taking the initiative against their opponents by occupying their traditional 
political territory. In the English-speaking world this would be seen as a tactic to respond to 
“wedging”, where an opponent was pushing issues that might divide one’s own constituency. Bush 
(2008) shows that these regulations were particularly prevalent in areas where Islamist politics 
have historically been strong (especially areas with a background in the Islamist separatist 
movement, Darul Islam) and concludes that parties such as Golkar felt “the need to ‘prove’ their 
Islamic credentials” (Bush 2008:12).  Of course Islamic parties and organisations were part of the 
wave of sharia-influenced regulation-making, but their prominence and vocalness tended to 
obscure the fact that other elements in the equation were also involved. Golkar in particular has 
been attempting to strengthen its relationship with Islamic organisations in recent years, a trend 
that arguably has increased with the assumption of party leadership by Yusuf Kalla.  
 
In the case of the RUU APP at the national level, there was a feeling in the DPR that it needed to 
respond to the general atmosphere of debate about laxness in morality and weak control of media 
content. There were indications that executive government wanted some action, with at least two 
government ministries discussing the need for regulation and having drafted unofficial bills on 
pornography. At the highest level of government, President Yudhyono expressed concern about 
standards of behaviour by media figures and the public in general, particularly women. In May 
2005, the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, the PKB leader Alwi Shihab, launched a 
government initiative establishing the Indonesian Committee to Eradicate Pornography and 
Pornoaksi (KIP3), a body which remained largely incipient but which was a clear signal of thinking 
in some parts of Cabinet. 
 
In the context of implicit pressure from executive government for a legislative response and the 
wider background of relentless media criticism of the DPR’s poor record of lawmaking ever since 
1999, the revival of the RUU APP in 2005 was an attractive option.19 For the members of 
Commission VIII the bill provided a ready-made opportunity in the form of a bill that was already 
drafted and which would represent legislative intervention in a policy issue that was capturing 
increasing public attention. For members of Golkar and the Democrat Party, it opened up the 
chance to build bridges to Islamic organisations, strengthen their profile within the santri religious 
community and take over new ground from their Islamic party competitors. 
 
Decision-making and party discipline in the DPR 
 
When attempting to analyse the strategies of political parties in Indonesia, it should be emphasised 
that coordination between the party organisations and the members in the DPR Fraksi and 
Commissions is often poor. Decision-making within in the DPR is rarely consistent or predictable. In 
most parliaments the strongest predictor of a Member’s voting record is his/her party, but this does 
                                               
19  See for example “House ends tenure with pathetic record”, Jakarta Post, 1 October 2004. “DPR has not passed a 
single law in nearly a year”, Jakarta Post, 15 June 2005. 
 10 
not always apply in the DPR. Party discipline is weak and, together with the dearth of developed 
party policies, the result is that many Members tend to follow a line set by their Commission. 
Commission solidarity is often stronger than party identification. Commissions sometimes disagree 
with each other across party lines and Members can be ignorant or uninterested about the work of 
fellow party members in other Commissions (Sherlock 2003).20 This is compounded by the fact that 
when differences of opinion do arise within a Commissions or Pansus, party allegiances frequently 
have no bearing on the disagreement. Even if a party has adopted an official position, it is not 
uncommon to witness Members advocating arguments at public hearings that are completely at 
variance with stated party policy and to be evidently unconcerned that this would result in 
disciplinary action.  
 
Thus the initiative to sponsor the RUU APP by Commission VII in 2003 or by its successor, 
Commission VIII in 2004 was not a centrally coordinated decision. It was, to a considerable extent, 
an initiative of individual members that was not necessarily in accord with all party leaders. This is 
particularly the case with Balkan Kaplale, the Chair of the Pansus, whose strident personal advocacy 
of the bill caused him to be increasingly viewed as a maverick by other Pansus members and even 
by members of his own party inside and outside the Pansus. Golkar members in the Pansus also took 
contrary positions on different aspects of the bill, particularly over the pornoaksi sections and the 
question of whether they should be considered separately from the rest of the bill. A leader of an 
organisation lobbying the DPR over the bill complained that even members of the PKS, despite their 
reputation for discipline, were often inconsistent in what they said, “similar to the ambivalent 
viewpoints of other major parties such as Golkar and PDI-P”.21 
 
A key feature of the complexity of decision-making in the DPR is that the weakness of party 
discipline in the parliament is something of a paradox. While Indonesia political parties are 
hierarchical and centralised, they rarely exercise effective control over their Members in the DPR in 
terms of policy. Power in most parties is focused on the Central Party Board (Dewan Pusat Partai - 
DPP) in Jakarta, and leaders are very intolerant of dissenters within the ranks. Capturing the central 
leadership tends to be a “winner takes all” contest. And this top-heavy structure has been 
entrenched in both the law on political parties and on elections. The law on parties provides that 
parties must be national (not regional) parties with a central board located in Jakarta. The various 
electoral laws state that candidates for both parliamentary and presidential elections must be 
nominated by political parties and the party list system in the parliamentary elections ensures that 
only candidates that are high on the party list are likely to be elected. Finally, the legislative 
provision for the “recall” of Members of the DPR gives party leaders the ultimate power over their 
members in parliament. The law provides that the party, not the member, holds the seat in the DPR 
and individual members can be removed from the DPR on the order of the party leadership. 
 
The power of “recall”, however, is not exercised in order to ensure that party policy is followed and 
that members vote along party lines. It has only ever been used in cases where Members have 
publicly embarrassed the party leaders or have fallen out of favour in an internal factional feud. 
Cases where a member has embarrassed the party have not been over policy differences but over 
personal behaviour. A Golkar member was recalled (although he actually resigned before the 
measure could be implemented) because a mobile phone video of his extra-marital affair was made 
public, a PAN member was recalled because of his involvement in overseas travel that became the 
                                               
20  DPR Members’ business cards usually identify their Commission rather than their party. 
21  Ratna Sarumpaet of the Unity in Diversity Alliance, as quoted in “Alliance fails to coax PKS on porn bill”, Jakarta 
Post, 8 July 2006. 
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object of media criticism, the PBB Vice Speaker was removed from parliament because he took a 
second wife and a Democrat member was recalled because of allegations of corrupt behaviour in 
haj catering contracts. In the case of internal party disputes, one leading PKB member lost his seat 
because he supported the losing side in a struggle over control of the central party board and a 
PDIP member was recalled because she stood in a provincial gubernatorial election on a ticket with 
a PKS candidate (Djadijono 2007: 189).  
 
The record of party leaders (whether in the party organisation or parliamentary wing) suggests that 
they are interested in wielding power over their members but are only incidentally interested in 
pursuing consistent party policy. Discipline is very weak when it comes to decisions to be made 
about parliamentary work. The occasions when fairly clear party lines have been drawn have usually 
been over passing single-issue controversies that involve government actions, including the 
reduction of fuel subsidies, the import of foreign rice or Indonesia’s support for UN sanctions 
against Iran. When it comes to the complex policy debate that can arise during deliberations on the 
content of a bill, it is more difficult to see consistency amongst party members. There is rarely 
evidence of ongoing consultation between party leaders (including in Cabinet) and Fraksi leaders 
inside the DPR, between the party machine and leading members in a Commission or Pansus or with 
individual party members in a Commission or Pansus. This, of course, varies from party to party 
(with PKS having the reputation for the strongest discipline), but the problem is a general feature of 
the DPR. 
 
The effect of “consensus” decision-making  
 
One of the key features of decision-making in the DPR that stands out from democratic parliaments 
throughout the world is the system of “consensus” (mufakat). Although decision-making by 
majority vote is usually considered to be a fundamental principle of democracy, votes are very rarely 
taken in the DPR. The mufakat system is putatively derived from Javanese traditions, became a 
central rationale for “guided” democracy, as distinct from majoritarian democracy, under the rule of 
President Soekarno and continued as one of the political instruments and ideological justifications 
for the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto. Despite the fact that mufakat was one of the 
main ways in which the rubber-stamp DPR was made to give docile agreement to every act of the 
President during the New Order, the DPR has retained this procedure in the era of democracy. The 
political effect of this system has been discussed more fully elsewhere (Datta 2002, Sherlock 2003). 
 
In the case of the RUU APP, the operational effect of mufakat is quite clear. In practice, mufakat 
does not depend on each and every one of the Members of the DPR giving their individual explicit 
agreement to every decision. The procedure is actually based on an implicit vote by Fraksi, that is a 
decision is said to have been made if no single Fraksi raises any objection. Each Fraksi effectively 
has a veto and if no veto is exercised then it is assumed that all Fraksi agree. But as the example of 
RUU APP shows, such agreement is actually very weak and is often repudiated at a later stage. As 
one PDIP member of the Pansus observed when explaining why the party’s members signed the 
documentation to make the RUU APP an initiative of the DPR, the members “probably did not 
bother to know what they were signing” (quoted by Braun 2008: 161). Mufakat has the effect of 
creating moral pressure to give consent, one result of which is that Fraksi often agree to things that 
they may later object to when the implications of the agreement become clear. This is not regarded 
as a neglect of good procedure, but according to DPR Members it is “normal practice” (quoted by 
Braun 2008: 161).  
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Thus a party such as PDIP could officially support drafts of the RUU APP on numerous occasions 
when the bill was passing through the various organs of the DPR, but then later reject the bill as 
deeply repugnant. But this did not apply only to that party. The observation that most DPR Members 
(whether in Commission VII/VIII, the Pansus or the plenary) probably did not even read the bill when 
they made decisions about its passage through the DPR was made to the author on numerous 
occasions by well-informed individuals, both inside and outside the DPR. The bill simply joined the 
backlog of other legislation that was accumulating unpassed in the chamber.  
 
This goes a long way to explaining why the RUU APP could lie unnoticed in the DPR from the days 
of the Habibie administration until 2005 and then seem to appear (muncul) suddenly onto the 
public stage and generate such hostility and division. Having been drafted without widespread 
public consultation, the bill reflected just a partial view of community opinions on the issue of 
pornography and was then used to introduce a wider range of strictures on public behaviour that 
were acceptable to only a minority current in Indonesian society. Even preliminary consultations 
with stakeholders and sources of expert opinion at an early stage of drafting would have quickly 
revealed the deep problems with the bill. Had wider public input been received during the initial 
conceptual stage, it might have been possible to avoid the consternation and panic that seemed to 
grip some parts of the country, particularly in places such as Bali and Papua, on the appearance of a 
draft that seemed to be on the verge of being made law.  
 
Mufakat also has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the problem of weak party discipline. 
Because mufakat is essentially a system of vote by Fraksi, it deprives individual Members of the 
right to vote and to have their individual agreement or dissent recorded. The only people who 
actually get to vote are Fraksi leaders, especially if the decision is a publicly controversial one. The 
leaders go into closed “lobbying” meetings and reach agreement without observers or minute-
takers. In these circumstances, it really does not matter if individual party members speak in an ill-
disciplined way in meetings and advocate positions that reveal that they neither understand their 
own parties’ policy nor know basic facts about the issues at hand. If the decision is politically 
important the Fraksi leaders decide and, according to the theory of mufakat, the fact that their 
members do not dissent means that they agree.  
 
This exacerbates the difficulty for external organisations attempting to be involved in DPR 
deliberations. Not only is it difficult to obtain reliable information about where the various parties 
stand, it is also difficult to know if the arguments made by the community organisations are 
actually reaching the ears of the real decision-makers. We have already noted that groups involved 
in the RUU APP debate complained that it was very difficult to get a clear impression from the 
parties about their respective positions on the bill because the line coming from members of the 
same party were contradictory.  
 
Party leaders see little need to enforce discipline in relation to party policy. So long as members 
stay loyal to the current leadership and do not allow their personal affairs to embarrass the party, 
they are largely free to act as they wish in DPR proceedings. It is significant that in the very few 
cases where votes have been taken in a plenary session because mufakat has broken down, (such as 
on the reduction in fuel subsidies and the import of rice) the absence of a record of party discipline 
has meant that party leaders have not been able to enforce a party position and their members 
have either voted against the party line or have absented themselves from the chamber. Votes do 
tend to take place more often in very small working group meetings where the final details of the 
wording of draft legislation might take place. This is probably because such meetings are attended 
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by the members who are actually seriously working on the bill rather than simply attending for the 
sake of form. 
 
Institutional incapacity and legislative drafting 
 
These problems relate, of course, to a broader range of institutional weaknesses in the DPR. Because 
the RUU APP was an initiative of the DPR, all the policy and technical issues involved in drafting 
were the responsibility of the parliament alone. Had it been a government initiative, much of the 
preliminary work would have been done outside the DPR, leaving the parliament the job of 
reviewing and responding to a developed draft. The legal drafting capacity of the DPR, however, 
remains weak and much of the policy input tends to come from outside sources and is adopted by 
the Commission or Pansus without it being subjected to wider scrutiny. As mentioned above, the 
content of the initial drafts of the RUU APP came from within government ministries, but only in an 
unofficial form that did not represent the views of government as a whole. 
 
Even the problem of weak drafting capacity and lack of policy expertise would not be such a 
problem if the DPR were generally a more open and transparent institution. Even if the DPR had not 
itself initiated consultation at the conceptual stage of the bill, the parliament would have received 
widespread outside input if the proposal for a bill on pornography was widely known. But the bill 
remained a closed issue for most of the community because DPR documentation can only be 
obtained by those with special access and contacts within the institution. 
 
Thus the effects of mufakat came together with broader problems of lack of institutional capacity 
in the DPR to produce a bill that was potentially dangerous to the very fabric of the Indonesian 
polity. The RUU APP reached a stage in the processes of deliberation in the DPR that it arguably 
should never have reached. An ill-considered bill that was still in need of basic conceptual analysis 
came to sudden public view because of the pressures placed on Members to express perfunctory 
agreement with an initiative which they had not considered in a serious way.  
 
The importance of early and complete public consultation  
 
We have argued above that an interaction between practices instilled by the culture of mufakat and 
the weak drafting and policy support in the DPR led to the RUU APP reaching the stage of being 
accepted as an official DPR Initiative bill before sufficient public consultation had taken place. This 
conclusion is worth reiterating because it is one of the key observations that can be made about 
what the RUU APP revealed about decision-making in the DPR. 
 
The experience of the RUU APP showed that consultation with stakeholders and the public as a 
whole not only needs to occur but should take a number of different forms at different stages of 
the development of a draft bill. The initial conceptual stage of development needs input from the 
key players, from expert opinion and from international experience. The RUU APP revealed the 
danger of the wholesale adoption of a bill based on the viewpoint of only a few stakeholders, even 
if the intention was to seek community views in later consultations. There needed to be input not 
just from a couple of religious organisations, but from the spectrum of religious and non-religious 
opinion on social and moral issues and on law enforcement in relation to such issues. Other critical 
views would include stakeholders in the media, from writers and artists and others involved in the 
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production of entertainment. In particular in a country as diverse as Indonesia, it would always 
seem advisable to consider if there was any particular regional implications of a bill.  
 
Once input has been received at an early stage and a draft prepared, legislation can be made 
available to the public with some confidence that major interest groups are both aware of the bill 
and have had their perspective on the issue considered. This is not to say that all interests will be 
satisfied but rather that the bill is unlikely to be inadvertently offensive to any major point of view. 
General public consultation can then take place in a more informed environment, with the DPR 
committee leading the discussion more aware of the issues and interests at stake.  
 
Along with the desirability of phased consultations, the RUU APP revealed the continuing problem 
of lack of general public knowledge about the processes and procedures of the DPR. The DPR 
remains an opaque institution where the most important decisions are still made behind closed 
doors and basic information and documentation is extremely hard to obtain without special 
privileged access. Information in the DPR is still regarded as a commodity to be horded and traded 
rather than to be provided as a service which the public has the right to expect. As well as being a 
violation of democratic principles, the story of the RUU APP shows that institutional non-
transparency can be politically dangerous and potentially damaging to social cohesion. 
 
Prolegnas and the heritage of unfinished business 
 
It has already been mentioned above that the RUU APP was an inheritance from the old DPR of 
1999-2004. The new DPR elected in 2004 was composed of 73 per cent new Members joining 
parliament for the first time under a reformed election system and with a new constitutional 
relationship with the now directly-elected President (Sherlock 2004). Yet despite the formation of a 
new government under an amended constitution and great changes to the parliament, the new DPR 
began its life burdened with a backlog of unfinished business from the old chamber. Nearly half of 
the new legislative program (Prolegnas) consisted of bills that the previous DPR had failed to pass.  
 
This practice of taking over a large part of the legislative program of an old government and an old 
parliament forms an important part of the problematic background of the RUU APP.  The decision to 
hand the unfinished bills on to the new DPR was made at a joint Government-DPR meeting at the 
end of January 2005, with the Government represented by the Minister of Law and Human Rights 
and the DPR represented by Baleg. It seems unlikely that one government ministry and one organ of 
the DPR could have given fresh and detailed consideration of the complexities of 22 bills in the 
short time available. Despite the critical importance of Prolegnas as an agenda for government 
(both the executive and legislative branches), it was barely considered by the Cabinet as a whole.  
 
The idea of Prolegnas as a planning tool, introduced in Law 24/2004 on the making of laws, was 
that it would be a process by which executive government and the parliament would consult on the 
agenda of proposed bills and give priorities for law-making in the upcoming period. In practice, 
however, Prolegnas has become a “laundry list” of bills with no indication of relative priority or 
importance. In the case of a bill such as the RUU APP, inherited from the old DPR, Prolegnas gives 
no explanation about whether the bill would be given low priority because it had not been drafted 
by the current DPR or whether it needed high priority because it was part of an apparent log-jam of 
unpassed bills. 
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One result of this practice is that the parliament is swamped by an unrealistically large number of 
bills that recent history has repeatedly shown it is unable to pass. The DPR itself gives ammunition 
to the constant critics in the media and NGOs who charge members of parliament with being lazy 
and incompetent. This promotes the tendency to rush to be seen making progress on a particular bill 
when pressure from the government and interest groups mounts on a particular issue. Against the 
backdrop of the rising concerns from some quarters about media content and public standards, the 
new and inexperienced DPR pushed ahead with the RUU APP, a bill that was not really of its own 
making and which required major rethinking before it could be presented as an official draft of the 
DPR. But with the DPR’s dearth of policy support and legislative drafting capacity, combined with 
its lack of transparency and public information, it failed to do the necessary preparatory work and 
produced a document that generated a storm of controversy and verbal conflict that even 
threatened the political fabric of the country. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The controversy on the RUU APP will probably come to be seen as a significant event in Indonesia’s 
post-New Order political history. It showed the deep differences between attitudes to what is 
acceptable public conduct amongst the diverse groups that make up Indonesian culture in the 
context of changing mores and foreign influences. Certain aspects of the bill were seen to attack 
the implicit compact between the various cultural, religious and regional communities that make up 
the Indonesian state.  
 
This paper has argued that the events surrounding the drafting of the RUU APP were more the 
result of a series of ill-considered moves than a deliberate strategy by any party or parties, whether 
parliamentary or extra-parliamentary. The origins of the bill were obscure and remain ill-understood 
by many of its proponents and critics. It lay largely ignored in the offices of the DPR Secretariat for 
a number of years before it was put into the public domain by a rather amorphous grouping of 
individuals within one Commission of the DPR. This grouping, and the Pansus that was made 
responsible for the bill, was something of a microcosm of the various currents of opinion in the 
DPR. But the debate within the Pansus was a complex interplay of interests, with longer term 
ideological tendencies contending with immediate calculations of partisan gain. Like the wave of 
sharia-influenced regional regulations, the RUU APP controversy was not a simple battle of 
secularism versus religious politics. Nevertheless, the bill showed that the interaction and 
contention between the various secular and religious streams (aliran) of thought in Indonesian 
society remain an established fact of Indonesian politics, even though their form has changed over 
time. 
 
The fact that the DPR proposed a piece of legislation with the capacity to generate such political 
heat, including rhetoric about the very unity of the state, highlights certain issues and problems 
about decision-making processes within Indonesia’s parliament. First of all, it shows that party 
discipline over policy matters in the DPR is very weak and that this results in very unclear lines of 
debate and a lack of predictability in members’ behaviour. The DPR as an institution is marked by a 
lack of coordination, not only between Commissions and other internal bodies of the parliament but 
also between party leaders and individual members in the course of their work within Fraksi and 
Commissions. It was very unclear where the various parties actually stood on the RUU APP, making 
it very difficult for the public to be involved in the debate.  
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The RUU APP revealed that consensus decision-making (mufakat) means parties often give their 
assent to certain proposals without really understanding or committing themselves. This allowed a 
flawed piece of legislation to proceed through the stages of deliberation within the DPR before it 
was really in a fit state to do so. And because mufakat is in reality a system of vote by Fraksi 
leaders, it both disempowers individual members and reinforces their lack of policy discipline. The 
quality of members’ information and understanding on the issues before them remains low because 
their vote is ultimately unimportant in the final decision-making forums of the closed-door 
lobbying meetings. 
 
The major deficiencies with the text of the RUU APP attested to the institutional weakness of the 
DPR in terms of legislative drafting and policy input. Because there is little in-house capacity, the 
DPR tends to seek outside assistance for both policy content and the text of the bill decides to 
initiate its own draft bill. While this practice should not be problematic in principle, it is potentially 
dangerous if the outside advice is too narrowly sourced and is not subject to wider input from a 
range of stakeholders. And because strategic planning and prioritisation of legislation does not take 
place, (even though this should happen in the Prolegnas process), individual Commissions will often 
seize upon and promote a piece of draft legislation before it is fully developed. If the proceedings of 
the DPR were more open and accountable to the outside world, a much more comprehensive 
spectrum of community opinion could have fed into the drafting of the RUU APP at a much earlier 
stage. The example of the RUU APP underscored the critical importance of early and complete 
public consultation on proposed legislation.  
 
Finally, the DPR’s experience with this contentious bill raises serious questions about the practice of 
wholesale adoption of leftover legislation from preceding parliaments. The Prolegnas has the 
potential to be a useful planning tool for the DPR and to help improve the quality of draft bills. But 
it should only include a total number of bills that it is realistic to expect the DPR to pass and which 
are seriously considered and prioritised before they are added to the list. In the absence of such 
planning the DPR is likely to sail unwittingly into the storms of potentially damaging controversies 
again in the future. 
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